Throughout the postwar era a special relationship between France and Germany has often been the catalyst for European integration. The two countries have achieved jointly the leadership that neither could sustain alone. However, the Soviet collapse has presented them with a new agenda of problems. German unification has resurrected old geopolitical fears and has had disruptive economic consequences.
Europe’s political earthquakes since 1989 have posed a formidable challenge for European Studies at SAIS. These essays on France are part of a continuing set of projects – “Discovering the New Europe” – whereby we have tried to rise to the occassion.
The geopolitical erthquakes of 1989-1992 – the end of the Cold War in 1989, German unification in 1990 and the disappereance of the Soviet Union in 1992 – have radically transformed the bipolar system that prevailed in Europe for more than 40 years. The Continent is no longer divided into two ostile military blocs and competing social and economic systems, and for the first time in decades the possibility of a true pan-European system – “a Europe from the atlantics to the Urals” – seems to have emerged.
Postwar Western Europe has been far more prosperous than ever before in its history. Yet, each postwar decade has marked rarher sharp changes in Europe’s economic position. The 1960s were a decade of unprecedented growth, and the 1970s a decade of stagflation and external shocks. As we reach the end of the 1980s, this decade seems to have been one of transition. Major changes in economic circumstances forced Western European conuntries to seek ways to recast their fundamental economic structures and policies.
Showing how the development of space techonlogy could affect the system of deterrence, the authors consider the consequences for US foreign policy, alliance relations and strategic stability. In the first essay Dr. Tucker argues that a greater commitment to defensive systems would not substantially affect deterrence or extendeddeterrence. Dr. Liska suggests that a new offense-defensemix might enhance deterrenc because of the greater uncertainty of military outcomes. European responses to SDI are examined by Dr. Osgood, who maintains that the issue of defensive shields could only become the chief obstacle to establishing a more stable offense-defense weapons mix acceptable to the allies. In Dr. Calleo’s view the strategic dilemma of the United States can be improved only through a devolution of security responsibility.
In the late spring of 1975, the Lehrman institute, a small private foundation devoted to the analysis of public policy issues, held a seminar entitled “New Modes of Economic Order.” The four essays presented in those sessions have been revised, edited, integrated and collected in this volume. Each of the chapters address the question of the postwar world political economy and its probable evolution. All focus on the monetary system, not only because of its intrinsic importance, but also because the authors fell that it served as a metaphor for the political-economic system in general.